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Incerteza da qualidade e atribuição de direitos de 
decisão na designação de origem protegida europeia
Neste artigo, consideram-se alguns problemas na governança da 
denominação de origem protegida (DOP) europeia. Os sistemas 
de DOP resultam das expectativas de agricultores e consumidores 
e conectam a valorização dos recursos agrícolas e rurais de deter-
minados territórios com a qualidade de produtos típicos. Um ponto 
crítico na gestão dos sistemas DOP é representado pela conexão 
entre as estratégias de qualidade e a incerteza. Argumenta-se que os 
sistemas DOP podem ser pensados como subsistemas estritamente 
coordenados, nos quais ex post a governança desempenha um papel 
fundamental para lidar com a incerteza da qualidade. No estudo 
sugere-se que os incentivos da sociedade criam sistemas organi-
zacionais complexos, nos quais a atribuição de direitos de decisão 
para organizações coletivas de DOP desempenha papel importante. 
A análise empírica é realizada por meio da análise de dez sistemas 
DOP italianos, a fim de identificar os direitos de decisão alocados.
Palavras-chave: denominação de origem protegida, adaptação,  
 alocação de direitos de decisão, incerteza da  
 qualidade, custos de monitoramento.
1. INTRODUCTION
The paper considers the governance of the European Protected Designation 
of Origin (PDO). Such type of Geographical Indications allows agents to or-
ganize quality based supply systems associated to territories and to traditional 
and typical products. Private and public parties are involved in the arrange-
ments supporting the PDO organization. The objective of the study is namely 
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to investigate whether in the PDO systems agents to cope with 
quality uncertainty allocate critical decision rights to the party 
expected to be able to maximize the value of the relationship. 
While the strategies based on PDO contribute to increase 
the value of the agricultural and rural resources matching con-
sumers requests (CAÑADA and VÀZQUEZ, 2005; BRUNO-
RI and ROSSI, 2007), they also posit several organizational 
issues related to the contractual hazards inherent to quality 
strategies and brands goodwill (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and 
VALCESCHINI, 2005 and 2009; SYLVANDER et al., 2006; 
BELLETTI et al., 2007; TRAVERSAC, ROUSSET, and PER-
RIER-CORNET, 2011). Broadly speaking, two main drivers 
promoted the development of PDO products in the European 
Union: the societal demand for traditional, historically ground-
ed, typical foods (which draw from specific geographical areas 
traditional values, history and cultural values) and, especially in 
rural areas, the entrepreneurial expectations about the possibi-
lities of valorising the resources employed in local farming and 
processing. The inducements stemming from the societal expec-
tations determined a sequence of innovations in the European 
institutional environment including changes and enhancement 
in the European and National Law systems as well as in the 
context of the international trade regulation (SYLVANDER et 
al., 2006; BELLETTI and MARESCOTTI, 2008; MOSCHINI, 
MENAPACE, and PICK, 2008). Two aspects are considered in 
particular in the present study: the first is that the PDO requires 
the setting up of a complex web of institutional relationships 
and that this gives raise to the emerging of a specific supply 
system (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005), 
the PDO system; the second is that the quality strategy sup-
porting the PDO face critical uncertainty issues which deter-
mine consequences on the governance choices (RAYNAUD, 
SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005 and 2009). 
I adopt a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach 
(WILLIAMSON, 1985). According to Williamson (2005), pro-
cessors and retailers require to support the quality strategies by 
adequate governance structures provided the constraints posited 
by the institutional environment. In the TCE perspective the 
contract outset separates the ex ante from the ex post stage. Ex 
ante and ex post transaction cost thus arise which have to be 
taken into account in the analysis of the governance choices in 
PDO system. The information asymmetry directly influences the 
organizational choices in this context due the credence nature 
of the qualitative characteristics. Therefore the main strategies 
adopted by the agents rely on the adoption of labels which 
transmit the information to consumers and stakeholders (HE-
NESSY, 1996; GOLAN et al., 2001; HOBBS, 2003). Third party 
certification, based on the State support and managed by spe-
cialized certification bodies, is the more diffused enforcement 
mechanisms adopted in PDO systems (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, 
and VALCESCHINI, 2005; BELLETTI et al., 2007). Uncer-
tainty about technology, market and behaviour of counterparties 
can hardly affect the quality outcomes. The quality strategies 
give raise to specific contractual hazards, mainly determined 
by the size and the specificity of investments made as well as 
the uncertainty. Complex governance modes are thus chosen 
by the agents (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 
2005) which are interrelated with the quality strategies imple-
mentation (ZYLBERSZTAJN and FARINA, 1999, p.255). As 
a consequence, the transactions along the vertical chains tend 
to be organized by governance modes more centralized than the 
pure spot market even though market elements are more present 
in the case of private branding (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and 
VALCESCHINI, 2005). The PDO systems tend to be character-
ized by a strict coordination (ZYLBERSZTAJN and FARINA, 
1999) in which several control structures (DAHLSTROM and 
NYGAARD, 1999) increase the efficiency of the quality ori-
ented organizational arrangements. 
In this context, a critical point is how the participants to the 
PDO system cope with the necessity to adapt the governance 
structures to the uncertain contingencies. Hybrids governance 
structures are often chosen in order to support quality strategies 
in European Agri-Food supply systems (MÈNARD and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2005) coping with uncertainty by giving raise to 
cooperative adaptation in the face of unforeseen contingencies 
(WILLIAMSON, 1991). While hybrid modes are character-
ized by the allocation of the decision rights among the parties 
(MÈNARD, 2011), it is recognized that the allocation of such 
rights to the party expected to maximize the surplus of the re-
lationship allows the parties to cope efficiently with uncertainty 
(GIBBONS, 2005; MÈNARD, 2011). It is important to note 
that the allocation of the decision rights is a critical analytical 
element in several economic theories. The agency theory 
contributed to the understanding of the organization of Agri-
-Food supply system by focusing on the ability of designing 
optimal contracts (AGARWAL, 1999; REES, 1985) entailing 
the decisions of both the principal and the agents. The theory 
of incomplete contracts (GROSSMAN and HART, 1986) sheds 
lights on how the ex ante allocation of decision rights sustains 
the setting up of efficient contractual arrangement coping with 
critical uncertainty issues in Agri-Food supply. For example, 
Hueth and Ligon (1999) contended that hen quality is not per-
fectly observable then the compensation of a supplier efficiently 
depends upon the variable providing information. Vetter and 
Karantininis (2002) crucially showed that the public monitoring 
activities may reduce the probability that vertical integration 
will be chosen to deal with moral hazard problem arising for 
credence goods and that this may have controversial effects on 
the welfare outcomes. Moreover, contract theory shows that 
the measurement issues become complex because of the cost 
of measuring quality characteristics as signal of performance 
(HUETH and LIGON, 1999). 
The paper contributes to the existing literature by emphas-
ising the centrality of adaptation in PDO governance and 
the allocation of decision rights (GIBBONS, 2005). To this 
purposes the study propose a straightforward interpretation 
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of PDO production rules in terms of monitoring costs and of 
product characteristics in terms of quality uncertainty. The 
decision rights are then identified, classified and framed within 
the relationship between the complexity of monitoring and the 
degree of quality uncertainty. This research question is drawn 
from the Gibbon’s (2005) adaptation theory and it is briefly 
discussed also with respect to other theoretical perspectives 
contributing to the understanding of the quality governance. 
The main results of the study is that the allocation of decision 
rights concerning the management of the quality uncertainty 
supports the complex set of relationships among private and 
public parties building up the PDO systems. 
The paper is organized as follows. The topic 2 illustrates 
the analytical framework. The empirical analysis is presented 
and discussed in the topic 3. The last topic delineates the final 
remarks, the limits of the study and some possibility of further 
studies.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Institutional innovations and the emerging of PDO  
 coordinated subsystems
According to European Union law the Protected Designa-
tion of Origin covers agricultural products and foodstuffs which 
are produced, processed and prepared in a given geographical 
area using recognized know-how (http://ec.europa.eu/agri-
culture/quality/schemes/index_en.htm). The EU Regulation 
aims at protecting the name of the agricultural products and at 
acting as a valorisation instrument (BELLETTI et al., 2007). 
The basic institutional characteristics of the PDO system can 
be summarized as follows (BARJOLLE and CHAPPUIS, 
2000; RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005; 
SYLVANDER et al., 2006; BELLETTI et al., 2007):
• the participants firms have to comply with Code of Productive 
Rules, including those drawn from tradition; 
• the production area is clearly identified and delimited;
• the quality is monitored and certified by the State or and 
organization accredited by the State;
• the participating firms build a collective body which has in 
charge several tasks, spanning from the protection of the label 
and its use to elaboration of plans to improve production 
techniques. 
The consumers and producers expectations concentrate 
on the origin (including the form of the connection with the 
territory), the specificity of the production process (technology 
choice), the quality of the products, market value (including the 
premium price for quality). To achieve goals associated with 
these expectations require to comply with the technological 
and administrative prescriptions. The Code of Rules defines the 
requisites that the PDO product has to meet to achieve and to 
maintain the denomination of origin (BELLETTI et al., 2007). 
The Control System is organized by through a public (or State 
supported) certification body, while the flows of critical infor-
mation are managed by a collective organization (RAYNAUD, 
SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005; BELLETTI et al., 2007) 
which often organize and manage also the traceability systems. 
The institutional analysis sheds light on the setting up of the 
PDO systems. The European producers and consumers organiz-
ations promoted enhancements aimed at favouring the valoris-
ation of the rural resources, the protection of traditional assets 
and the assurance of food quality. These inducements gave 
raise to the innovation of institutional environment (NORTH, 
1990). The institutional innovation determined the emerging of 
specific subsystems that allows the achievement of the quality 
objectives. According to the Williamson’s (2005) theoretical 
four level schema, these inducements in turn affect the gov-
ernance choices. The governance structures and institutional 
framework articulate a complex system of relations, which 
integrates individual and collective actions ensuring the supply 
the quality products. More precisely, the institutional innova-
tion promoted by the European Union channelled the building 
up of a system architecture in the sense that “it progressively 
shaped organizations and institutions that support efficient 
supply systems and enforce coordination” (ZYLBERSZTAJN 
and FARINA, 1999, p.250). The quality of the end-product 
is actually an outcome of all the stages of the vertical chains. 
Therefore the PDO systems participants need to coordinate 
the activities in order to achieve the quality objectives. The 
coordination approach entails a sequence of transactions which 
may be governed by different modes. Scholars showed that this 
induces the emerging of vertical subsystems based on strictly 
coordinated transactions with specific tools to cope with ex-
ternal shocks, information systems, management capacity to 
react and coordinate the adaptation (ZYLBERSZTAJN and 
FARINA, 1999, p.255).
The Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of an Eu-
ropean PDO system. 
The Figure 1 represents the very simple case in which four 
stages are vertically organized by governing the transactions 
(T.1, T.2, T.3) in order to produce and deliver to the consumers 
the PDO products. The Code of the technical rules normal-
ly concern the stages 2 and 3 – even though the stage 1 is 
sometimes entailed – and are administrated by the Regulatory 
Council set up by the European Union and the Regional Gov-
ernment, if it exists. The control and certification activities are 
carried out by a third party (Monitoring Body in the Figure 1) 
which normally has a public nature (see GONZÀLEZ-DÌAZ, 
FERNANDEZ BARCALA, and ARRUÑADA, 2003, and 
DENTONI, MENOZZI, and CAPELLI, 2012, for a more de-
tailed examples). The governance of the system is articulated at 
different levels: the governance structures chosen by the parties 
to organize a given transaction; the contractual framework 
sometimes provides by Producers Organization participating 
to the system; the section of the institutional environment 
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constituted by the certification and control bodies as well us 
the Consortia of participants whose activities span from the 
protection of the brands to the promotion of technological inno-
vation. To the purpose of this study I pay a particular attention 
to the collective organizations (like the Consortia) because the 
role they have in the quality strategies. 
The institutional innovation determined the setting up 
of complex relationships among the chain agents. The Code 
of Rules and the control system strengthen the coordination 
among farmers and processors that participate to the PDO. The 
stable interaction via these institutional elements promotes the 
connection within the set of the agents. The alignment of the 
production practices routinizes the pattern of interaction and 
control so that groups of farmers and processors tend to form 
tight sets, internal to the PDO systems, engaged in production 
and marketing of PDO products. Analytically, the concept of 
strictly coordinated subsystem (ZYLBERSZTAJN and FARI-
NA, 1999) applied to the PDO economy allows for both an ac-
curate delimitation pf PDO from the remaining food systems in 
a given geographical area and for an explanation of the internal 
articulation of the same PDO system. How the agents organise 
their relationship in this system is crucial to the achievements 
of the quality objectives (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2009). The quality characteristics are normally not 
easily observable (MÈNARD and VALCESCHINI, 2005) and 
this determine both ex ante and ex post transaction costs. The 
governance structure are efficiently chosen in order to min­
imize such costs (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHI-
NI, 2005). Furthermore, the capability to achieve the quality 
objective largely depends upon the possibilities of adapting the 
governance structures to the events unforeseeable at the contract 
outset. In the following I firstly examine this aspect and I submit 
that the innovation of the institutional environment requires 
the design of a complex relationship, entailing a significant 
allocation of decision rights. Secondly, adding to the existing 
literature I will argue that the allocation of decision rights to 
the PDO’s collective organizations contributes to reduce the 
monitoring and measurement costs in the ex post stage and is 
related to the quality uncertainty.
2.2. Quality strategies and governance choices
Scholars analyzed the process of building up the PDO sys-
tems focusing on the relationship between the quality strategies 
and the governance choices. The economic analysis recognizes 
that the link between the attributes of an agricultural product 
and its place of origin can be expressed by an appropriate label. 
On the other hand, the reliability of the information provided to 
Figure 1
A Schematic Representation of an European PDO System
Source: Adapted from Gonzàlez-Dìaz, Fernandez Barcala, and Arruñada (2003).
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the consumers is an essential pre-requisite. Raynaud, Sauvée, 
and Valceschini (2005) analyze the PDO system under the 
perspective of the connection between the labelling strategies 
and the quality enforcement devices. Their central hypothesis 
is based on the Williamson’s concept of contractual hazards 
and claims that a branding strategy will affect the attribute of 
transaction within the chain and modify the nature and/or the 
extent of coordination problem (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and 
VALCESCHINI, 2005, p.53). Three main classes of contractual 
hazards are considered: quality cheating in vertical chains; 
hazards related to specific investments; quality uncertainty 
and measurement issues. Investments are required to support 
a branding strategy in order to build a reputation. As the 
input of several parties influence the quality of the branded 
end­product, each firm has incentive to encourage the other 
to make the investments needed. As a consequence the brand 
owner should design the intermediate transaction in order to 
mitigate the free-riding potential (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, 
and VALCESCHINI, 2005, p.53-54). Temporal, physical and 
site specificity may affect the transaction in PDO system even 
though its collective nature may reduce the effect of the hold-up 
problem “as the investments made to comply with the quality 
specification are more ‘PDO­specific’ that specific to a parti­
cular bilateral transaction” (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2005, p.59). The third class of contractual hazards 
includes the quality uncertainty and the measurement issues 
which tend to increase with the number of the participating 
firms. Quality grading as well as direct control of given stages 
of production process of the counterparty are among the me-
chanisms adopted to reduce quality uncertainty (RAYNAUD, 
SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005, p.57). A causal nexus 
between the branding strategies and the governance structure 
choice can be thus traced under a TCE perspective (Figure 2) 
(RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009, p.842).
While quality depends upon the coordination of all the 
agents along the vertical chain, not all the transaction are equal-
ly salient to a given branding strategy: it is a specific task of 
the participating firms to asses how a given branding strategy 
affects the types and the intensity of the contractual hazards, 
therefore the alignment between the branding strategies and 
governance structure requires that the firm matches the type 
of governance structure with the salience of the vertical trans-
action (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009, 
p.841-842). While the salience of the transaction represents a 
tool for managing the branding strategy, it remains a relative 
concept that emphasizes a ranking of the vertical transactions. 
The salience of the transaction can thus be thought of as an 
instrument for the necessity of the strict coordination to the 
purpose of the PDO systems effectiveness. 
Two empirical evidences (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and 
VALCESCHINI, 2009) are of particular interest here:
• The contractualization appears to be the main governance 
structure adopted (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCES-
CHINI, 2009, p.859), to the purposes of the present study 
this suggests that branding strategies encourage the parties 
to combine the detailed specification of the terms of the 
agreement with the flexibility needed to manage the emerging 
contingencies determined by quality uncertainty. 
• Ex post decision making mechanisms complement contract-
ual agreement in order to coordinate the participants; these 
mechanisms often entails the setting up on representative 
basis of “formal body” with explicit power to take ex post 
decisions and to adapt to contingencies (RAYNAUD, SAU-
VÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009, p.857).
These evidences confirm the centrality of the adaptation in 
PDO systems and the role of the contract as the basic tool of the 
governance. The concept of adaptation helps to understand a 
central outcome of the innovation process depicted. Adaptation 
is a central problem of economic organization (WILLIAMSON, 
1985 and 1991). In the context of this study it is referred to 
the fact that, due to unforeseen contingencies associated to the 
quality, the parties may face specific coordination issues. Quali­
ty uncertainty is in turn caused by the combination intrinsic 
heterogeneity and the time variability of the raw material with 
the information asymmetry between the parties of the vertical 
transaction. To analyse these aspects it is necessary to focus 
some elements of the PDO systems.
2.3. Organizational elements and the transaction costs in a  
 PDO system
2.3.1. Governance and collective organizations
The institutional framework of the PDO systems accounts 
for the complementarity of three basic elements (BARJOLLE 
Figure 2
Causal Nexus Between Branding Strategies and Governance Choices 
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and CHAPPUIS, 2000; RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2005; BELLETTI et al., 2007): the governance 
structure of the single transaction; a collective organization 
which normally includes producers and processors associations 
(with general tasks aimed at label protection, see Topic 4) and 
the certification body (see Figure 1). The governance structure 
allows the party to organize each given transaction (e.g., T.1, 
T.2 or T.3 in Figure 1). Raynaud, Sauvée, and Valceschini 
(2005) explained in details how the governance structure copes 
with specific PDO contractual hazards. The Certification body 
carry out the control of the compliance with the Code of Rules 
and certify the correspondence of the product with the basic 
requirements. According to PDO norms, the participants often 
establish collective organization (e.g. Consortia) which are in 
charge of carrying out several activities based upon the consti-
tutive acts of the PDO and the Codes of Rules. The collective 
organizations are bodies intended to protect the interests of 
all the PDO systems stakeholders. They have the main task 
of protecting the PDO label from the external competition 
and manipulation. To these purposes they collaborate with the 
Public Administration. Furthermore, the collective organiza-
tions promote the marketing of the products labelled and may 
contributes to the development of quality by several types of 
actions. However, the collective organizations not only are 
committed to carry out activities which would be too costly 
for the single participant, they also cope with the contractual 
hazards mentioned contributing to reduce the consequent trans-
action cost which should be alternatively borne by the parties.
2.3.2. Contractual hazards, transaction costs and roles of  
 the collective organizations 
Under a TCE perspective the quality and branding strate-
gies require to cope with quality cheating, hazards related to 
specific investments and quality uncertainty and measurement 
issues (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009) 
and ambiguity (MOOI and GOSH, 2010). Environmental and 
behavioural uncertainty (WALKER and WEBER, 1984) may 
induce the parties to organizational agreements to invest large 
resources in monitoring and measurement costs. Therefore, the 
performance of a PDO system relies of the ability of the parties 
to bilateral agreement and of collective organizations to cope 
with monitoring and measurement issues connected with the 
compliance with the Codes of Rules and the protection of the 
brand goodwill. Hence the ex post transaction costs are critical 
to the achievements of the quality objectives. When the PDO 
system is established, contractual hazards cause specific ex 
post transaction costs mainly associated with the compliance 
with the Code of Rules. The monitoring of the parties activ-
ities requires resources to plan and to carry out the controls. 
Measurement issues are also critical due to the difficulties of 
observing several quality characteristics (RAYNAUD, SAU-
VÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005). For each characteristic the 
monitoring costs depends upon the capacity of the party to 
observe the action of the counterparty. These costs increase 
with the information asymmetry and can be exacerbated by the 
asset specificity (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 
2009). The measurement cost increase with the difficulty of 
observing the quality characteristics (BARZEL, 1982), thus 
they are expected to be high in the case of the PDO because of 
the importance of credence characteristics. The complexity of 
the product characteristics may increase the ex post monitor-
ing costs. An inadequate monitoring system could determine 
similar consequences. Furthermore, unforeseen contingencies 
concerning the technology or the market may require the 
parties to adapt their activities in order to sustain their coordi-
nation. Lacks in the coordination patterns cause the emerging 
of maladaptation costs pushing the governance structure out 
of the alignment (WILLIAMSON, 1991; DAHLSTROM and 
NYGAARD, 1999; MOOI and GOSH, 2010, p.108). The 
parties may be induced to negotiate their adaptation to new 
circumstances bearing high haggling costs (WILLIAMSON, 
1991). In such cases the inability of activating adequate flow 
of communication by the management of the PDO could 
exacerbates the maladaptation costs (DAHLSTROM and 
NYGAARD, 1999). The whole system may be thus forced to 
face high ex post transaction costs. Moreover, the potential for 
opportunism is magnified by the specific investments (brand, 
certification costs etc) and by uncertainty (HEIDE and JOHN, 
1990, p.27; STUMP and HEIDE, 1996; DAHLSTROM and 
NYGAARD, 1999, p.162). The increasing ex post trans-
action cost may determine failures in achieving the quality 
strategic objectives. The role of the formal public institution 
has a prominent importance for the credibility of the label 
(RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009). In fact 
the effectiveness of the monitoring is crucial to achieve the 
quality objectives. The selection of the potential participants 
imposes the admission in the PDO system of firm whose 
ability to fulfil the fixed requirements is proved. However, an 
important organizational problem the parties have to address 
ex ante is to design and to implement an effective monitoring 
system in the organizational and institutional framework of the 
PDO system. The monitoring system, while guaranteeing the 
compliance with the whole set of the rules set up, also com-
plements the governance modes as a “coordination oriented 
safeguards” (GONZÀLEZ-DIAZ, FERNANDES BARCALA, 
and ARRUÑADA, 2003; GONZÀLEZ-DÌAZ, FERNANDEZ 
BARCALA, and RAYANUD, 2009) especially in the case of 
the hybrid or market-oriented structures.
More precisely, one may contend that the PDO system 
reduces the ex post transaction costs as:
• it reduces the volume unpredictability(1): the production 
volumes are usually better known than in the case of the 
standard private bilateral transaction, therefore the market 
uncertainty – which normally is an important part of the 
environmental uncertainty – is less influential;
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• analogously, it reduces the technology unpredictability, 
as very often the PDO system sustain activities aimed at 
facilitating the technology innovation and its implemen-
tation;
• it promotes joint action among the parties (CAÑADA and 
VÀZQUEZ, 2005; DENTONI, MENOZZI, and CAPELLI, 
2012) and this increase the efficiency of the governance as 
showed by Heide and John (1990, p.25);
• the public certification facilitates the access to written ad 
already formalized specification (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, 
and VALCESCHINI, 2009) and formalization is a control 
structure favouring a more efficient governance (DAHL-
STROM and NYGAARD, 1999);
• traceability and certification are used as a support device help-
ing the implementation of the quality control (RAYNAUD, 
SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009, p.857-858).
In addition, the PDO system virtually reduces the cost of 
measurement because it reduces the resources to be used in the 
market measurement carried out by the consumers. Actually 
consumers estimate the distributions different sellers offer and 
then determine the properties of the individual items (BARZEL, 
1982, p.31). The PDO system reduces also the costs needed to 
form the supply distributions by seeking to channel toward an 
uniform level of the products supplies. Moreover the increase 
of the quality characteristics determines the increase of meas-
urement costs and the buyers and sellers assessments may not 
converge (BARZEL, 1982, p.31): the PDO systems contributes 
to reduction of these costs by synthesizing the attributes in the 
collective brand.
Furthermore, the PDO collective organizations, compared 
to possibilities of the parties to a bilateral arrangement, reduces 
the ex post transaction costs by through: 
• promoting the coherence of the activities (CAÑADA and 
VÀZQUEZ, 2005) – also by the power to manage the PDO 
including the liberty to exclude or to admit participants, also 
coping with the risk of horizontal free-riding (RAYNAUD, 
SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005) – and this support 
the joint action of the parties contributing to the efficiency 
of the governance (HEIDE and JOHN, 1990, p.25);
• easily implementing collective traceability programme 
(RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2009) econ-
omizing on negotiating and ex post haggling costs;
• achieving scale economies in the management and assess-
ment of inputs quality (RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2009), reducing the management costs;
• contributing to build up a meticulous certification system 
which helps the distributors when applying the traceability 
scheme by facilitating the choice of the product references 
for the quality control activity (CAÑADA and VÀZQUEZ, 
2005; RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VALCESCHINI, 2005, 
p.48) and contribute to reduce monitoring and measurement 
costs;
• managing the process of labelling and control the information 
flows in collaboration with the Control body, having also the 
power to sanction the lack of compliance;
• carrying out the monitoring and measurement activities in an 
more efficient way than the individual party due to the scale 
effects; thus monitoring the compliance with the technical 
rules making more effective the activity of the Certification 
body;
• implementing plans of enhancement of the production rules 
or aimed at developing innovation.
The most of the economizing possibilities mentioned are 
based on the allocation of decision rights to the collective or-
ganizations in the field of monitoring, controlling and setting 
up procedures for traceability, certification, innovation and 
labels protection. Beyond the explicit allocation of decision 
rights to the collective organization, the parties may also restrict 
their own domain of action: in this view, a restriction of the 
individual rights is similar to the allocation of decision rights 
to the collective organization(2). In such a way the collective 
organization contribute to reduce the transaction costs asso-
ciated to the contractual hazards and thus favour the ex post 
adjustments to the unforeseeable contingencies. 
The allocation of decision rights form the individual parties 
to the collective organizations take place in a context made by 
control structures (formalization, design and implementation 
of monitoring and control systems, interfirms cooperation) 
which constitute the institutional dimensions by which the 
PDO system frame the organizational arrangements among 
the participants in order to achieve the quality objectives. The 
formalization concerns with the extent to which rules and 
procedures govern the relationship between the inter-organ-
izational partners (DAHLSTROM and NYGAARD, 1999, 
p.162). The Design and the implementation of monitoring 
and control systems provide the basis for operationalizing 
the quality strategy and promote the convergence of the PDO 
participants toward common pattern of activities monitoring. 
The interfirm cooperation refers to the extent to which the 
PDO participants coordinate their strategies (DAHLSTROM 
and NYGAARD, 1999, p.162; DENTONI, MENOZZI, and 
CAPELLI, 2012).
In sum, environmental and behavioural uncertainty largely 
affect the quality outcomes and thus the PDO quality strategies 
mainly rely on the ex post adaptation in order to cope with the 
disturbances that may emerge after the contract outset. The 
allocation of the decision rights to the collective organization 
contributes to the ability of the PDO system to reduce the ex 
post transaction costs. By the allocation of the decision rights 
from the individual parties to a collective organization, this 
becomes able to allow the maximization of the surplus of the 
exchange relation in the PDO system as it operates in critical 
areas with larger efficiency that the individual parties to the 
transactions. The adaptation is based on the allocation of critical 
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decision rights at the time of the negotiation of the governance 
structure (GIBBONS, 2005), I thus examine more in details 
how this proposition could enhance the comprehension of the 
PDO governance. 
2.4. Quality uncertainty as driver of adaptation:  
 hypothesis for the empirical analysis 
Uncertain events may be caused by changes in the environ-
ment (market demand or technology, WALKER and WEBER, 
1984) or the behaviour of the counterparty (WILLIAMSON, 
1985 and 1991). The larger is the set of the characteristics, 
the more the influence of the three types of uncertainty is 
exacerbated as they may influence a larger number of events. 
In the PDO system the main consequences is that the parties 
anticipate this fact at the contract outset and expect that the 
monitoring and the measuring costs may increase. The eco-
nomic theory states that the party will adapt the governance 
structure in order to cope with the uncertainty. Adaptation is a 
central problem of economic organisations (WILLIAMSON, 
1985 and 1991), and its conceptualisation is integrated within 
complementary theoretical perspectives. Arruñada, Garicano, 
and Vàzquez (2005) posit that the assignment of decision rights 
in long-term relationships provides an opportunity to reduce 
the associated bargaining costs. Ménard (2004 and 2010) 
offers a generalisation of the adaptation concept for the class 
of hybrid governance structures. Gibbons (2005) subsumes 
the theme of adaptation in a complex theoretical structure by 
framing four elemental theories of the firm. Among them, the 
adaptation theory asks whether integration or non-integration 
better facilitates ‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ in 
the sense of Williamson (GIBBONS, 2005, p.205). Gibbons 
(2005, p.230-231) elaborate an adaptation theory of ex post 
governance structured in a formal integrative framework 
articulating the following timing:
• governance structure negotiation;
• ex ante action taken;
• interim signal observed;
• ex post decision taken;
• payoff received.
Therefore the adaptive, sequential decision-making is mod-
elled in terms of contracting the ex ante allocation of critical 
decisions rights across firms boundaries to one party (stage I) 
who will take the decision (stage IV) having observed the state 
(stage III) of the nature unforeseeable at the time of the choice 
of the governance structure (stage I). The ex ante allocation of 
the decision rights to one party is thus the means the parties 
adopt to undertake the ex post adaptation to disturbances.
In the PDO context the quality uncertainty is direct related 
to the number of the quality characteristics of the final prod-
uct, while the monitoring and measurement costs are directly 
associated to the technical rules negotiated in the Code of 
Rules. The Graphic 1 illustrates the hypothetical relationships 
between the Quality Uncertainty and the Monitoring and 
Measurement Costs.
The control structures support the parties and the collec-
tive organization in coping with the ex post transaction cost. 
Namely, formalization provides the basis for the participants to 
comply and for the certification body and the collective organ­
Graphic 1
Theoretical Relationship Between Quality Uncertainty and Monitoring and Measurement Costs
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ization to monitor and control the choices made. The Graphic 
1 allows a theoretical comparison between the allocation of 
decision rights to the counterparty of a vertical transaction and 
the allocation to the collective organization. Because of the ca-
pability of the collective organization to reduce the monitoring 
and measurement costs the pattern of the relationship between 
the uncertainty and the costs is different in the two alternatives. 
More precisely, provided that environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty raise measurement and monitoring costs, one can 
submit the following hypothesis: 
H1 – In PDO systems the participants have interest to allocate 
critical decision rights to the collective organization, as it 
is expected to be more able to maximize the total value 
than the individual counterparty.
In the context of this analysis a decision rights over the use 
of the resources is of particular importance as such decision 
directly affect the quality output and the value of the products. 
Furthermore, the management of the technological innovation 
– if admitted – and the protection of the common label are also 
particularly important. Among these decision rights those con-
cerning the more uncertain events are critical for the goodwill 
of the brand. The importance of the critical decision rights is 
of course longer in the case of salient transaction.
In the following I test these two hypothesis by the results 
of the empirical analysis.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: A STUDY ON THE  
 ALLOCATION OF DECISION RIGHTS
The empirical analysis reports the evidence of ten diverse 
case studies (SEAWRIGHT and GERRING, 2008) under a 
confirmatory perspective. According to the usual approach in 
Agri-food sector (STERNS, SCHWEIKHARDT, and PETER-
SON, 1998), a set of research questions has been preliminarily 
specified. The crucial question here concerns whether or not 
agents in PDO systems, in order to cope with quality uncertain-
ty, allocate critical decision rights to the party expected to max-
imize the surplus of the relationship. Theoretical propositions 
have been then composed and structured in order to define a 
prediction pattern. The generalization method is the analytical 
generalization in which a previous developed theory is used 
as a template for comparing the empirical evidence from case 
study (YIN, 1994, p.31) and in which results are generalized 
to theory. The adaptation theory (GIBBONS, 2005) provides 
the analytical framework to link empirical data to theoreti-
cal propositions. Criteria for interpreting the findings are 
derived from the usual business study and Transaction Cost 
Economics approaches.
The case study design includes multiple units of analysis 
and aims at examining the relations along the supply chains. 
The sources of the data used were official documents.
According to Raynaud, Sauvée, and Valceschini (2005) the 
unit of analysis is the vertical chain. I consider ten Italian PDO 
systems chosen among them whose label is well known from the 
consumers and thus area characterized by well-grounded quality 
strategies. The PDO systems considered are the following:
• Olio Umbria – olive oil produced in Umbria (Central Italy);
• Mozzarella di Bufala – special cheese produced by buffalo 
milk in a group of administrative partitions in South Italy;
• Prosciutto di Parma – traditional ham produce in Emilia 
Romagna (Central Italy);
• Mele Val di Non – apple produced and packaged in North East 
administrative partition, includine three differen varities; 
• Pecorino Toscano – traditional Tuscany (Central Italy) sheep 
cheese;
• Cinta Senese – traditional pork meat, produced in the admi-
nistrative partition of Siena (Tuscany, Central Italy);
• Pecorino Romano – traditional sheep cheese produced in 
Central Italy;
• Prosciutto San Daniele – typical ham produced some admi-
nistrative partitions of North East of Italy;
• Parmiggiano Reggiano – typical cheese obtained by a com-
plex production process from selected bovine milk in specific 
administrative partition of Emilia Romagna and Lombardia 
(North Italy).
The analytical framework introduced above provides the 
basis for the predicted pattern of nonequivalent variables (YIN, 
1994) is derived, from the analytical framework introduce 
above. Firstly, the predicted pattern deals with the mutual 
dependence issues and the role of uncertainty (GIBBONS, 
2005). Therefore the predicted pattern includes: allocation 
of decision rights associated to uncertainty; role of collective 
organization in coping with uncertainty. The study aims thus 
at showing that the empirical evidence is consistent with the 
predicted pattern. To a some extent, the matching between the 
predicted and the empirical patterns would provide a control 
of the theory proposed.
In order to test the hypothesis I analyzed the official doc-
uments concerning the Code of Rules and the setting up of 
the collective organization (normally having the form of Con-
sortium). The sources of the data were the DOOR Database 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html;jses-
sionid=LJQ2PDpJBr8Wrn8ChNGpmSVWdggb0lQQc7hmZ-
JLPpQvTJ5TVr9vf!-1533155053) of the European Union and 
documents published in the web by the collective organization. 
The DOOR Database is directly accessible and include the legal 
information concerning the PDO registered. I then conducted 
the analysis of the documents in order to:
• to identify the technological rules of each PDO system;
• to identify the official quality characteristics of the end-
-products;
• to identify the critical decision rights mentioned in the official 
documents.
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I classify the decision rights identified three types: 
• decision rights allocated from the farmers to the processors;
• decision rights allocated from the farmers to the collective 
organization;
• decision rights allocated from the processors to the collective 
organization. 
The classification of the decision rights simply relates 
to the basic classification of the transactions of the PDO 
system (GONZÀLEZ-DÌAZ, FERNANDEZ BARCALA, 
and ARRUÑADA, 2003; RAYNAUD, SAUVÉE, and VAL-
CESCHINI, 2005). The idea is to identify subsequently the 
decision rights centralized at the collective level comparing 
the “centralized” decision rights with those exerted by the 
individual parties. I used the technological rules as an index 
of the monitoring and measurement costs (see Graphic 1). 
Differences emerged among the various documents with re-
spect to the details, phrasing and complexity of the text to be 
analyzed. However, the decision rights can be easily identified 
as they are normally explicitly mentioned. The technical rules 
are summarized in the Tables 1 and 2. 
As it is expected each PDO system requires farmers and 
processors to comply with technical rules which concerning 
the production process as well as the plants characteristics. In 
the case of Parmiggiano Reggiano and Prosciutto di Parma the 
control activities are facilitated by the use of specific marks. 
In many case private additional labels are not admitted. For 
each case the number of technical rules identified is used as an 
index of the monitoring and the measurement costs. The rules 
codified in the official documents analyzed relate directly to the 
potential source of environmental and behaviour uncertainty. I 
reported the environment oriented (concerning the technology) 
and behaviour oriented (labelling, registration, marking) rules 
for farmers and processors in the Graphic 2 and 3, respectively. 
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The environmental rules are mostly taken into account 
than the behavioural role this clearly reflect the necessity of 
economizing via formalization on monitoring cost (resource 
consumed in order to guarantee the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations) (DAHLSTROM and NYGAARD, 1999). More-
over, one has to point out that according to agricultural con-
tracts theory (AGRAWAL, 1999) the compliance efforts are 
formalized for both the farmers and the processors.
The decision rights identified are classified in the Tables 
3, 4 and 5. 
I considered a simplified representation of the vertical chain 
based on three agents associated to the basic elements of the 
PDO systems: farmer, processor and collective organization. 
This does not account for the complexity of the organization 
of the real systems, but it is sufficient to capture the difference 
in the allocation of the decision rights which are in the focus 
of the empirical analysis. These rights mainly concern with 
the technological innovation, the monitoring activities, the 
enhancement of the Code of Rules and their enhancement as 
well as the protection of the label. It is worth to note that the 
cases appear to be different with respect to the allocation of 
decision rights even though they share a similar quality strat-
egy (PDO). The explanation I propose is that the differences 
relate to the variability of monitoring and measurement costs 
across the case and to the differences in terms of technolog-
ical characteristics. The PDO systems examined are specific 
because of several original characteristics, mainly determined 
by the history, the territory influence and the intrinsic nature of 
agricultural raw material and products. The environmental and 
behavioural uncertainty affect in variables manner the systems 
considered and it is reasonable to expect the measurement and 
monitoring costs vary across the cases. Moreover, the variabili-
ty of the technological characteristics causes additional effects 
as different requirements in terms of technological innovation 
and may arise. 
In order to test the hypothesis I distributed the nine case 
studies in two-dimensional space based on the indexes of moni-
toring and measurement costs (number of technical rules) and of 
quality uncertainty (quality characteristics of the end-product). 
The Graphic 4 illustrates the distribution of the case studies.
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For each case I determined the number of the quality charac-
teristics declared in the official documents. The characteristics 
relates mainly to the organolectic properties, including chemical, 
physical and microbiological ones (Table 1 and 2). The rationale 
for their specification in the documents is normally drawn from 
Graphic 3
Processors – Environment and Behaviour Oriented Rules
Graphic 2
Farmers – Environment and Behaviour Oriented Rules
the technological historical analysis of the products. I then used 
the number of the quality characteristics (x axis) and of the tech-
nical rules (y axis) in the Graphic 4. According to the analytical 
framework I assume the quality characteristics as an index of the 
uncertainty the parties may face. In this perspective the number 
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Right to plan 
the time to 
deliver  the 
product to the 
processor








quality f the 









    
of technical rules is intended as an index of the monitoring and 
measurement costs the parties may bear. More precisely, in the 
Graphic 4 I do not present any costs estimates, rather I just aim 
to account for an index of the potential costs, the parties should 
expect to face. Consider now the relation between the quality 
characteristics and the number of technological rules (as index 
of the monitoring and measurement costs): the level of moni-
toring and measurement costs is expected to increase with the 
uncertainty (quality characteristics). The Graphic 4 accounts for 
the assumption that the larger are the costs expected because the 
uncertainty, the larger are the number of the technical rules. The 
positive relationship between the costs and the number of the 
rules is explained by the formalization. In fact, the formalization 
is a control structure intended to reduce the measurement and 
the monitoring costs, thus my assumption in Graphic 4 is that 
a larger (smaller) number of technical rules indicates that the 
parties may be lead to bear large (smaller) costs. Therefore in 
the constitutions of the organizational arrangements the parties 
negotiate the number and the type of technical rules according 
to the expectation that such formalization will help them to 
economize on monitoring and measurement costs. 
I then compared the number of decision rights allocated 
to the collective organization by the farmer and the proces-
sors (bilateral agreement) with the number of decision rights 
allocated by the farmer to the processors: this comparison 
is illustrated by the digits in brackets for each PDO system 
name in the Graphic 4. Drawing from the analytical frame-
work I expect that the lager the quality uncertainty the larger 
should be the critical decision rights allocated to the collective 
organization compared with those that the farmer allocates 
to the processor. The comparison among the number of the 
decision rights allocated to the collective organization and to 
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the processors show that the larger is the number of the quality 
characteristics (quality uncertainty), the larger is the number 
of the decision rights allocated to the collective organization 
relatively to those allocated to the processors. According 
to the analytical framework proposed, this evidence would 
suggests that the allocation of decision right to the collective 
organization contributes to reduce the monitoring and meas-
urement costs which would increase due to the high quality 
uncertainty. Therefore the hypothesis H1 should be accepted: 
in the Graphic 4 the two lines just indicate the different pat-
terns of the relationship quality uncertainty-monitoring costs 
hypothesised in the Graphic 1. A controversial evidences 
is represented by the case of Prosciutto di Parma which is 
collocated close to the cases characterized by a low number 
of rights allocated to the collective organization. A potential 
explanation is that the allocation of decision rights has been 
implemented in a not efficient way. Moreover, in the variabili­
ty observed the cse of the Cinta Senese deserves attention. As 
there is no evidence for allocation of decision rights to the 
collective body it does not operate and this may represent a 
evidence supporting the rejecting of the hypothesis. However, 
also in this case a possible alternative explanation may be that 
the choice was inefficient. 
5. FINAL REMARKS
The paper examined some governance issues in the field 
of PDO systems. These systems have a prominent role in the 
agricultural and rural economy in many European countries, 
The study pointed out that a nexus exist from the producers 
and consumers expectation to the emerging of complex institu-
tional relationships among private agents, public (certification) 
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Table 5
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bodies and collective organization. The quality uncertainty is 
here considered in the light of Transaction Costs Economics: 
according to Raynaud, Sauvée, and Valceschini (2005) I as-
sumed that it may be exacerbated by the agents behaviours 
and that it act as a transaction attribute. Scholars emphasised 
the necessity of designing ex post design mechanisms to cope 
with uncertainty: the study focused in the allocation of critical 
decision rights and highlight the role of the PDO collective 
organization. The society’s inducement are thus thought as of 
drivers of the process of decision rights allocation. The main 
limit of the study is represented by the small number of cases 
examined. A more accurate specification of monitoring and 
measurement costs may be achieved by gathering data from a 
larger sample. Future research may be carried out in order to 
develop the empirical analysis and the analysis of the allocation 
of decision right in terms of efficient alignment.
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Graphic 4
Quality Uncertainty, Monitoring and Measurement Costs and Allocation of Decision Rights
(1) Drawing from Walker and Weber (1984), Heide 
and John (1990, p.28) define volume unpredicta­ 
bility as the inability to forecast accurately the vol- 
ume requirements in the relationship and techno- 
logical unpredictability as the inability to forecast 
accurately the technical requirements in the relation-
ship.
(2) I am in debt for this observation with one of the 
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Quality uncertainty and allocation of decision rights in the European protected designation  
of origin
The paper considers some issue in the governance of the European Protected Designation of Origin (PDO). The 
PDO systems are the outcomes of both farmers and consumers expectations and connect the valorisation of the agri-
cultural and rural resources of given territories to the quality of typical products. A critical point in the governance 
of the PDO systems is represented by the connection between the quality strategies and the uncertainty. The paper 
argues that the PDO systems can be thought of as strictly coordinated subsystems in which the ex post governance 
play a critical role in coping with quality uncertainty. The study suggests that the society’s inducements given raise 
to complex organizational systems in which the allocation of decision rights to PDO collective organizations play 
a major role. The empirical analysis is carried out by examining ten Italian PDO systems in order to identify the 
decision rights allocated.
 
Keywords: protected designation of origin, adaptation, allocation of decision rights, quality uncertainty,  
 monitoring costs.
Incertidumbre sobre la calidad y asignación de derechos de decisión en la denominación de 
origen protegida europea
Se consideran aquí algunos problemas en el gobierno de la denominación de origen protegida (DOP) europea. Los 
sistemas de DOP resultan de las expectativas de agricultores y consumidores y establecen una relación entre la 
valoración de los recursos agrícolas y rurales de determinados territorios y la calidad de los productos típicos. Un 
punto crítico en la gestión de los sistemas DOP está representado por la relación entre las estrategias de calidad y la 
incertidumbre. En este estudio se argumenta que los sistemas DOP pueden ser vistos como subsistemas estrictamente 
coordenados, en los que el gobierno ex post desempeña un papel fundamental para hacer frente a la incertidumbre 
sobre la calidad. Se sugiere que los incentivos de la sociedad crean sistemas organizacionales complejos en los que 
la asignación de derechos de decisión a organizaciones colectivas de DOP representa un importante papel. Se lleva a 
cabo un estudio empírico por medio del análisis de diez sistemas DOP italianos, con el fin de identificar los derechos 
de decisión asignados.
Palabras clave: denominación de origen protegida, adaptación, asignación de derechos de decisión, incertidumbre  
  sobre la calidad, costos de monitoreo.
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